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Comments
The Common Enterprise Element of the
Howey Test

Federal securities laws' provide special remedies and protection for

investors. 2 The threshold inquiry to the jurisdictional reach of the
Securities Acts is whether a particular scheme of financing is a
security. 3 Under federal securities laws, "security" is defined to

include standard 4 and catch-all instruments. 5 The investment contract

has been classified as a catch-all instrument within the definition of

1. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77a-aa (West 1981) (Securities Act of 1933), 78a-kk (West 1981)
(Securities Exchange Act of 1934). See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.100-230.656 (1986) (regulations for
the 1933 Act), 240.0-1 to 240.31-1 (1986) (regulations for the 1934 Act).
2. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.A. § 77e (Vest 1981). Issuers of securities must register with the
Securities and Exchange Commission. Id. Any person who offers or sells a security without
registering or qualifying for an exemption is liable for damages. Id. §§ 771, 77k (1981).
3. Id. §§ 77b(l), 78c(a)(10) (1981). Section 2 of the Securities Act of 1933 provides that:
"(1) [T]he term 'security' means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence
of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment
contract, voting-trust certificate . . . ." Id. § 77b(1) (1981) (emphasis added). Section 3 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides that: "(10) [T]he term 'security' means any note,
stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, certificate of interest or participation in any profitsharing agreement or in any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust
certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract,
voting trust certificate .... " Id. § 78c(a)(10) (1981) (emphasis added).
4. Id. §§ 77b(l), 78c(a)(10) (1981) (examples of standard instruments include stock, notes,
debenture, and treasury stock). See Mofsky, Some Comments on the Expanding Definition of
"Security," 27 U. MIAI L. REv. 395, 396-97 (1973).
5. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77b(1), 78c(a)(10) (West 1981) (examples of catch-all instruments
include investment contract and profit-sharing agreements). See Note, DiscretionaryCommodity
Accounts as Securities: An Application of the Howey Test, 53 FoRDH~m L. Rav. 639, 643
(1984) (citing Goldon v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139, 1144 (2d Cir. 1982) for proposition that
Congress intended an investment contract to be a catch-all phrase).
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a security. 6 Thus, a common litigation strategy is to characterize a

transaction that is not clearly a standard instrument as an investment
contract in order to invoke the special remedies and protections of
the Securities Acts.7 Consequently, a controversy has arisen among
the federal courts regarding the meaning of "investment contract."
A definition of investment contract was set forth by the United
States Supreme Court in Securities & Exchange Commission v. W.J.
Howey Co. 8 According to the Court, an investment contract is a
transaction 9 or scheme in which a person (1) invests money, 10 (2) in
a common enterprise, (3) and is led to expect profits," (4) solely
from the efforts of a promoter or third party. 2 Since Howey, federal
courts have struggled to define "common enterprise"' 3 and are
presently divided as to the precise meaning of the term. 4 One view

6. See Comment, Catch-All Investment Contracts: The Economic Realities Otherwise
Require, 14 Cumn. L. REv. 135, 136 (1984). See also Mofsky, supra note 4, at 397.
7. See Carney, Defining a Security: The Addition of a Market-Oriented Contextual
Approach to Investment Contract Analysis, 33 EMORY L.J. 311, 318 (1984). See generally
Prentice & Roszkowski, The Sale of Business Doctrine: New Relieffrom Securities Regulations
or a New Haven for Welshers?, 44 OHao ST. L.J. 473, 511 (1983) (noting substantive and
procedural advantages of suing for fraud under federal security laws rather than state common
law).
8. 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946).
9. See Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security": Is There a More Meaningful
Formula?, 18 CAsE W. REs. 367, 378 (1967).
A transaction "describes a concatenation of separate but related events, such as
transfers of money and property, written promises, oral promises and representations,
and even surrounding circumstances. All occurences and events which can, in a
broad sense, be properly considered as part of one bargain are welded together into
one legally significant event for securities law purposes."
Id.
10. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 560 n.12 (1979) (extending
the money requirement to include the investment of goods or services).
11. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975) (profit includes the
anticipation of capital appreciation).
12. Id. The Court in dicta dropped the word "solely" from the Howey test. The Court
noted a ninth circuit decision which held that the word "solely" should not act as a strict or
literal limitation in the definition of an investment contract but should be read realistically so
as to include schemes that involve securities in substance if not in form. Id. at 852 n.16 (citing
S.E.C. v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821
(1973)). The court declined to express any view as to the interpretation by the ninth circuit of
the Howey test. Id.
13. The common enterprise element of the Howey test has also been referred to as the
commonality requirement. See Note, supra note 5, at 646-50.
14. Mordaunt v. Incomco, 469 U.S. 1115, 1116 (1985) (White, J., dissenting) (refusal to
review the split in the lower courts as to the fulfillment of the common enterprise element of
the Howey test). See Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 622 F.2d 216, 224
(6th Cir. 1980) (defining common enterprise in terms of horizontal commonality); Hirk v.
Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96, 100-01 (7th Cir. 1977) (defining common enterprise
in terms of horizontal commonality); Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459, 461 (9th Cir. 1978)
(defining common enterprise in terms of strict vertical commonality); S.E.C. v. Koscot
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imposes a strict interpretation of vertical commonality."5 Under strict

vertical commonality, the economic successes or losses of an investor
and a promoter must be mutually dependent. 16 In contrast, another
approach utilizes horizontal commonality.' 7 Horizontal commonality
requires a pooling of funds or a pro rata distribution of profits

between all investors.'" Finally, an intermediate position imposes a
broad view of vertical commonality. 9 Under the intermediate ap-

proach, the requisite commonality is present if the success or failure
20
of the investment is dependent on the expertise of the promoter.
Initially, this comment will examine the legislative history of the

federal securities laws. 2' Next, the United States Supreme Court's
definition of an investment contract will be examined. 22 The approaches of the various federal courts of appeals defining common
enterprise will be analyzed. 23 Finally, this comment will propose that
the courts apply each of the commonality tests to the transaction

since this analysis better comports with the legislative history and
with the standard set forth in the Howey case. In addition, the

differences among the lower courts will be reconciled through a single
approach for determining whether the commonality element of the
Howey test has been met.24
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
By 1933, blue sky laws 25 existed in forty-seven of the forty-eight

states. 26 Despite the state regulations, deplorable practices were corn-

Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 478-79 (5th Cir. 1974) (defining common enterprise in terms
of broad vertical commonality); S.E.C. v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 522
(5th Cir. 1974) (defining common enterprise in terms of broad vertical commonality).
15. Brodt, 595 F.2d at 461; Mordaunt v. Incomco, 686 F.2d 815, 817 (9th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1115 (1985). See also infra text accompanying notes 144-53 (discussion
of strict vertical commonality).
16. E.g., Brodt, 595 F.2d at 461. The court did not find a common enterprise because
success by Bache did not guarantee a return for Brodt. Id.
17. Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96, 101 (7th Cir. 1977). See also infra
notes 87-119 and accompanying text.
18. E.g., Hirk, 561 F.2d at 101.
19. S.E.C. v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 1974>. See also
infra notes 120-43 and accompanying text (discussion of broad vertical commonalty).
20. E.g., Koscot, 497 F.2d at 479. See also Note, supra note 5, at 648-50 (broad view of
vertical commonality also called dominance commonality).
21. See infra text accompanying notes 25-56.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 57-84.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 85-179.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 180-86.
25. State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52, 53, 177 N.W. 937, 938 (1920)
("speculative schemes having no more basis than so many feet of blue sky"). See Comment,
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monplace in the securities industry. 27 Insider trading, 2 short sales, 29
wash sales, 30 failure of promoters to disclose information,3 and false
news accounts 32 were some of the practices prevalent in the securities
markets. 33 As a direct result of these abuses and the ineffective
enforcement of the blue sky laws, half of the $50 billion of new
securities sold in the decade following World War I proved to be
worthless .

34

The Stock Exchange Hearings3 conducted in 1932 by the Senate
Banking Committee publicly revealed many of these lamentable practices within the securities industry.36 Increased public awareness,
combined with the 1929 stock market crash, transformed America's
laissez-faire business ideology37 to a regulatory reform ideology. 3

Are Limited Partnership Interests Securities? A Different Conclusion Under the California
Limited PartnershipAct, 18 PAc. L.J. 125, 129 (1986) (state securities laws are referred to as
blue sky laws because the purpose of the statutes was to protect farmers from buying a piece
of the blue sky).
26. See Comment, supra note 6, at 139. See generally W. PAINmR, PROBLEMS AND
MATERALS IN BUsE-Ess PLANNING 602 (1975) (the philosophy of many states is that there are
some offerings that the investor needs to be protected from whether or not the facts have
been disclosed).
27.

See J. SELIMAN, THE TASFORMATION OF NVLL STREEnT 16 (1982). Some commen-

tators have suggested that the blue sky laws never had a chance to succeed because of the
interstate nature of securities transactions. Id. at 45.
28. J. SELIOMAN, supra note 27, at 34. For example, Morgan & Co. offered stock to firm
members and influential individuals at a cost lower than the value the stock was to be traded
on the public market. The preferred investors were able to gain a sure profit. Id.
29. Id. at 9. A person selling short is counting on the stock decreasing in value. Stock is
sold to a purchaser by a person that does not own the stock. The person then borrows stock
from a broker to deliver to the purchaser. The person profits, if the price of the share drops,
by purchasing the shares at a lower price to return to the lending broker. Id.
30. Id. at 17. A wash sale occurs when shares of a stock are bought and sold by the
same persons or pool of persons to create the appearance of activity on the stock. The trading
volume may increase the stock prices by luring new investors to trade in the security. Id.
31. Id. at 28 (information provided in prospectuses were often inaccurate and misleading).
32. Id. at 16-17. For example, in a 10 year period, publicist A. Newton Plummer had
received $286,279, for deliberately printing favorable news stories to raise the prices of several
separate stocks. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1. Between September 1929 and July 1932 the value of all stocks listed in the
New York Stock Exchange declined from a total of $90 billion to just under $16 billion-a
loss of 83%. Id.
35. Stock Exchange Practices Hearings before the Senate Banking Comm., 72d & 73d
Congs. (1932-1934). See generally J. SELoMAN, supra note 27, at 1 (the Senate Banking and
Currency Committee investigation of stock exchanges practices in 1932-1934 is also called
Pecora hearings in recognition of the counsel of the committee, Ferdinard Pecora).
36. J. SELGMAN, supra note 27, at 2 (purpose of the hearings was to determine what
caused the decrease in the value of securities and to propose legislation to prevent another
stock market crash). See Carney, supra note 7, at 348 ("Congress saw the crash of the
securities market as a cause rather than an effect of the Great Depression").
37. See Balkin, Ideology and Counter-Ideology from Lochner to Garcia, 54 UMKC L.
Rnv. 175, 178 (1985) (laissez-faire ideology emphasizes economic individualism). See also
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This ideological shift culminated with the passage of the Securities
Act of 1933 (hereinafter 1933 Act) and the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (hereinafter 1934 Act). Legislative history is minimal due to

the haste in which the Securities Acts were passed. 39 The scope of
the federal securities laws, however, provides a basis for determining

the protections Congress intended to provide the public through these
statutes.
A.

The Securities Act of 1933
The 1933 Act has two substantive provisions. 40 First, the registra-

tion and prospectus provision requires persons to disclose information
to potential investors and to the Securities and Exchange Commission
prior to selling or offering to sell any new securities. 41 Second, the

general fraud provision provides a remedy for misrepresentations
made by a promoter or an issuer in offering and selling new secu-

rities. 42 Through these disclosure provisions, Congress intended to
protect investors against fraud and to promote ethical standards of

honesty and fair dealing. 43

WEBSTER'S THmD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1265 (1976) (the policy or practice of
letting people act without interference or direction; the policy of letting owners of industry
and business fix the rules of competition, the conditions of labor, etc. in their discretion
without governmental regulation or control).
38. See Balkin, supra note 37, at 188 (regulatory reform ideology is a preference for
uniform national governmental regulation of the economy). See also J. SEMGMAN, supra note
27, at 2, 13.
39. Comment, supra note 6, at 140. "Congress needed only 60 days with which to pass
the most 'technical' and 'intricate' legislation theretofore introduced on Capitol Hill." Id. at
140 n.36. See also Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 694-95 n.7 (1985). The
Court acknowledged that the legislative history was silent as to whether Congress had contemplated the particular type of transaction involved in the case when enacting the Securities Acts.
Id.
40. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77a-aa (West 1981). See infra text accompanying notes 41-42.
41. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77e-j (West 1981).
42. Id. § 771 (1981).
43. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975). The Senate outlined
the purposes of the Securities Act of 1933 as follows:
The purpose of this bill is to protect the investing public and honest business. The
basic policy is that of informing the investor of the facts concerning securities to be
offered for sale in interstate and foreign commerce and providing protection against
fraud and misrepresentation.
The aim is to prevent further exploitation of the public by the sale of unsound,
fraudulent, and worthless securities through misrepresentation; to place adequate
and true information before the investor; to protect honest enterprise, seeking capital
by honest presentation, against the competition afforded by dishonest securities
offered to the public through crooked promotion; to restore the confidence of the
prospective investor in his ability to select sound securities; to bring into productive
channels of industry and development capital which has grown timid to the point
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The 1933 Act, however, did not vest the Securities and Exchange
Commission with the power to make judgments about the investment
quality of the security or the power to enforce blue sky laws.4
Moreover, the 1933 Act only regulates the distribution of new issues
of securities. 45 The 1933 Act does not regulate securities that are

subsequently traded in the market. To address these problems, Congress passed the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
B.

The Securities Exchange Act of 1934

Congress intended the 1934 Act to protect investors against manipulation of stock prices by regulating transactions in securities
exchanges and in over-the-counter markets. 46 The 1934 Act prohibits
fraudulent acts and practices by specific participants 47 in specific
markets 48 involved in specific transactions. 49 The 1934 Act imposes

regular reporting requirements on companies whose stock is listed on
nationally regulated securities exchanges.5 0 In addition, the 1934 Act
created the Securities and Exchange Commission and vested the
Commission with authority to enforce both of the Securities Acts."
The 1933 Act is a narrow statute that is chiefly concerned with
disclosure and fraud in connection with the initial distribution of
newly issued securities.5 The 1934 Act is general in scope but chiefly

of hoarding; and to aid in providing employment and restoring buying and consuming
power.
S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933). See generally Cohen, FederalLegislation Affecting
the Public Offering of Securities, 28 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 119, 156 (1959) (the intent of
Congress in enacting the Securities Act of 1933 was to impose a fiduciary standard on persons
who solicit and take public money for investment purposes).
44. See Anderson, The DisclosureProcessin FederalSecurities Regulation:A BriefReview,
25 HAsTiNGs L.J. 311, 322 (1974) (differentiating state security provisions from federal security
provisions). See also Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEo.
WAsH. L. REv. 29, 34 (1959).
Our [Landis-Cohen] draft remained true to the conception voiced by the President
in his message of March 29, 1933 to the Congress, namely that its requirements
should be limited to full and fair disclosure of the nature of the security being
offered and that there should be no authority to pass upon the investment quality
of the security.
Id.
45. Anderson, supra note 44, at 321.
46. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976).
47. E.g., 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c (West 1981) (brokers and dealers).
48. E.g., id. § 78i (1981) (exchange transactions).
49. E.g., id. § 78n(e) (1981) (tender offers).
50. Id. § 781 (1981) (prohibits the use of the facilities of an exchange unless the securities
are registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission).
51. Id. § 78d (1981).
52. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 728 (1975).
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concerned with the regulation of trading on the stock exchanges and
securities trading markets. 53 Both the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act
constitute interrelated components of the federal regulatory scheme
54
that governs many types of securities transactions.
The applicability of either of the federal securities statutes depends
on a finding that the transaction falls within the definition of a
security. The definition of a security is similar in both Acts and
includes the term investment contract. 5 Although Congress failed to
define investment contract, the term has been described as a catchall term that empowers the Securities and Exchange Commission to
deal with new manipulative devices that fall within the ordinary
concept of a security.5 6 Precise definition of the term investment
contract is therefore important in determining the jurisdictional reach
of the acts.
THE INVESTMENT CONTRACT
57
The term investment contract originated in the blue sky laws.
Minnesota was the first state to use the term in a security statute.5 8
The Minnesota Supreme Court, in State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber
Co. 59 interpreted investment contract as an investment of capital in
a way intended to secure profits ° The court described the term
investment contract as a broad concept encompassing the regulation
of any transaction not expressly exempted by the Minnesota blue sky
law.6 1 Other states soon included investment contract within the

53. Id.
54. Id. at 727-28.
55. See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 555 n.3 (1982) (the United States Supreme
Court has consistently held that the definition of "security" in the 1934 Act is the functional
equivalent to that in the Securities Act of 1933). See also United Hous. Found., Inc. v.
Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847 n.12 (1975) (the definition of security in both acts is almost
identical and may be considered the same).
56. See Comment, supra note 6, at 135. See also H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1933) (the definition was fashioned in "sufficiently broad and general terms so as to include
within that definition the many types of instruments that in our commercial world fall within
the ordinary concept of a security").
57. State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52, 53, 177 N.W. 937, 938 (1920)
(defining investment contract as a security). See Comment, supra note 6, at 137.
53. MNN. STAT. ANN. § 80A.14 subd. 18 (West 1986). See also Note, Pension Plans as
Securities, 96 U. PA. L. Rnv. 549, 553 (1948) (early cases and statutes indicated the term
investment contract primarily related to preventing abuses in the sale of land for speculative
purposes).
59. 146 Minn. 52, 177 N.W. 937 (1920).
60. Id. at 53, 177 N.W. at 938 (interpreting an investment contract as a contract for the
"placing of capital or laying out of money in a way intended to secure income or profit from
its employment").
61. Id.
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definition of a security and adopted the definition of investment
contract promulgated by the Minnesota Supreme Court. 2 State blue
sky laws guided Congress in drafting the Securities Acts. 63 In particular, Congress adopted the definition of security from the Uniform
Sale of Securities Act of 1929. 64 Since the meaning of investment
contract had been crystallized in prior state lawv, 65 the inclusion of
the term in the federal definition of a security is indicative of
congressional intent to reach many new types of commercial instruments that fall within the ordinary concept of a security.66
Following the enactment of the securities provisions, the federal
courts attempted to define investment contract.6 The first United
States Supreme Court decision to interpret "investment contract"
was Securities & Exchange Commission v. C.M. Joiner.68 In Joiner,
a corporation sold oil and gas leases for small acreages of land. The
leases included an agreement to complete the drilling of a test well
on the leased acreage. 69 Justice Jackson, writing for the majority,
stated that the transaction was an offer to sell an "exploration
enterprise" and not a mere leasehold right. 0 Jackson concluded that
the agreements were investment contracts because the investor paid
for a lease and for a development project. 7' The Court explained
that the term "investment contract" included uncommon and irregular investment devices. 72 The Joiner Court looked to the terms of

62.

See, e.g., People v. White, 124 Cal. App. 548, 554-55, 12 P.2d 1078, 1081 (1932)

(investment certificates evidencing receipt of money constituted an investment contract); Lewis
v. Creasey Corp., 198 Ky. 400, 441, 248 S.W. 1046, 1049 (1923) (sale by wholesale grocer of

service contracts to retail dealers not an investment contract).
63. Comment, supra note 6, at 139.
64. See Note, supra note 58, at 560 (citing Hearings Before Comm. on Interstate &
Foreign Commerce on H.R. 4314, 73d Cong., 1st. Sess. 13 (1933)). See generally L. Loss &

E. CowETr, BLUE SKY

LAW

(1958). The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform

State Laws and the American Bar Association approved the Uniform Sales of Securities Act

of 1929. Id. at 230. The passage of the 1933 Act introduced problems between federal and
state coordination of security regulations making the 1929 Uniform Act obsolete. Id. at 231.
In 1944, the Conference struck the Uniform Act from the list of approved acts. Id.
65.

S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey, Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946).

66. Id. at 298-99. The Howey test "embodies a flexible rather than a static principle, one
that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those who
seek the use of the money of others on the promise of profits." Id. at 299.

67.

See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Bailey, 41 F. Supp. 647, 650 (S.D. Fla. 1941) (tung tree groves

with management contracts); S.E.C. v. Pyne, 39 F. Supp. 434, 435 (D. Mass. 1941) (undivided

interests in fishing boats).
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
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the contract, the plan for distribution of profits, and the economic
73
inducements held out to attract potential investors.
The Joinercase was followed by Securities & Exchange Commission
v. W.J. Howey Co.7 4 in which the United States Supreme Court
further refined the definition of an investment contract. 5 In Howey,
the Securities and Exchange Commission sought to enjoin two
corporations from selling and offering to sell units of a citrus grove
development. 76 The two corporations were under common control
and management. 77 One corporation owned tracts of citrus acreage,
while the other corporation was a service company engaged in cultivating, harvesting, and marketing orange crops.7 8 The corporations
offered each prospective customer a land sales contract and a service
contract.7 9 While purchasers were free to make arrangements with
other service companies, eighty-five percent of the acreage was sold
to investors who also purchased the service contracts.80 The purchasers
were predominantly business and professional people who lacked
knowledge about cultivating citrus trees, but were attracted to the
offer by the expectation of profit.81
The United States Supreme Court held that this transaction was
an investment contract.8 2 Noting that the term "investment contract"
was not defined in statutes or legislative reports, the Court determined
that Congress had intended that investment contract be defined in a
manner consistent with the meaning reflected in prior state court
decisions and blue sky laws. 83 Thus, the Court held that when money
involving a named or described security as provided in the statutory definition of a security,
are, as a matter of law, a security. Id. But see United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421
U.S. 837, 849 (1975). "Because securities transactions are economic in character Congress
intended the application of these statutes to turn on the economic realities underlying a

transaction, and not on the name appended thereto." Id.
73. Joiner, 320 U.S. at 352-53. In determining the existence of an investment contract,
this approach has been described as the market oriented approach and has been supplanted
by the Howey test. Carney, supra note 7, at 320.
74. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).

75. Id. at 299.
76.

Id. at 294-95.

77. Id. at 295.
78.

Id.

79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 296.
82. Id. at 299.
83. Id. at 298 (quoting State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52, 56, 177 N.W.
937, 938 (1920)). In addition, the Howey Court cited several cases which applied a definition

of investment contract similar to that of the Minnesota Supreme Court. Howey, 328 U.S. at
298 n.4 (citing People v. White, 124 Cal. App. 548, 12 P.2d 1078 (1932); State v. Evans, 154
Minn. 95, 191 N.W. 425 (1922); State v. Heath, 199 N.C. 135, 153 S.E. 855 (1930); Klatt v.
Guaranteed Bond Co., 213 Wis. 12, 250 N.W. 825 (1933)).
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is invested in a common enterprise with the expectation of earning
a profit solely from the efforts of others, an investment contract has
been formed.84 The Howey test continues to be the standard for
determining whether a transaction is an investment contract.
COMMON ENTERPRISE

Authorities agree that the Howey test should be used to determine
whether a transaction is an investment contract. The federal courts
are divided, however, regarding the application of the common
enterprise element of the Howey test.8" Three different approaches
to the meaning of common enterprise have been developed by the
federal courts. 6 This section will delineate the various approaches
and analyze the merits of each approach in terms of the purposes of
the Securities Acts.
A.

Horizontal Commonality

The horizontal approach, which can be traced to the Howe),
decision, 87 requires a pooling of investors' funds88 or a pro rata
distribution 9 of profits among investors. 90 Thus, by definition, this
approach requires the scheme or transaction to involve the joint
participation of more than one investor in the sharing of profits or
the investing of money. 9 1 The focus of horizontal commonality is
strictly limited to the relationship among the investors and does not

84. Howey, 328 U.S. at 298-99.
85. See supra note 14. Compare S.E.C. v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516,
522 (5th Cir. 1974) (broad approach to vertical commonality) and Booth v. Peavey Co.
Commodity Servs., 430 F.2d 132, 133 (8th Cir. 1970) (broad approach to vertical commonality)
with Mordaunt v. Incomco, 686 F.2d 815, 817 (9th Cir. 1982) (strict application of vertical
commonality), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1115 (1985) and Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc.,
457 F.2d 274, 278 (7th Cir.) (horizontal commonality approach), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887
(1972).
86. See supra text accompanying notes 15-20.
87. S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). In Howey, the fruit from the orange
trees was collectively marketed and sold. The proceeds were distributed to the investors in
proportion to the number of citrus trees owned by each investor rather than by the yield of
each individual tree. Id. at 296. These facts have been interpreted as requiring pooling or pro
rata distribution of profits. E.g., Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622
F.2d 216, 222 (6th Cir. 1980).
88. See Peloso & La Bella, Determiningif DiscretionaryCustomer Accounts Are Securities,
9 SEC. REo. L.J. 307, 318 (1982) ("investor funds" includes the assets pooled into a particular
scheme by multiple investors).
89. See BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 637 (5th ed. 1983) (pro rata distribution allots profits
or losses according to the proportion of ownership or interest).
90. Curran, 622 F.2d at 222-23.
91. See id.
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inquire as to whether the promoter is involved in the scheme. 92
In Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc.,9 seven family members
deposited money 94 into a discretionary commodities trading account. 9
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that the common
enterprise element of the Howey test had not been met. 96 According
to the court, the broker was merely an agent representing the family. 97
Even though all of the customers of the broker were represented by
a common agent, the common enterprise element was lacking because
the customers did not jointly participate in a single investment
enterprise. 98 Since the funds of all the customers had not been pooled
or the profits had not been shared by all the customers, horizontal
commonality was lacking. 99
In a subsequent case, Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc.,'0° the
same court reaffirmed the horizontal theory of commonality despite
the development of vertical commonality in the other circuits.101 Hirk
entered into a trading agreement with Agri-Research Council, a
company engaged in managing discretionary future trading accounts. 10 2 Horizontal commonality was not found. 0 3 The Hirk decision was based on three principles: the remedial nature of federal
securities laws, the legislative history that the federal securities laws
should be construed liberally and flexibly to effectuate their purposes,
and prior case interpretation that a securities transaction should be

92. See id. See also infra text accompanying notes 120-53 (the broad and strict approaches
to vertical commonality focus on the role of the promoter in the scheme).
93. 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972).
94. Id. at 275.
95. Id. For factually similar cases, see Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.
1978); S.E.C. v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974). See Peloso &
La Bella, supra note 88, at 308. A discretionary account is one in which the investor gives
the broker power of attorney to make all trading decisions. The broker is empowered to
manage the account for the benefit of the investor and does not have to consult or obtain
permission to trade the accounts. Id. at 308 n.l.
96. Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274, 275 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 887 (1972). The plaintiff's claim was based on an alleged securities violation. The broker
had failed to register the discretionary commodities trading account as a security. Id.
97. Id. at 278 (plaintiffs were just one principal of the broker agent).
98. Id. at 276-78 (quoting Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 1149, 115153 (N.D. Ill. 1970)). "Even if he [broker] had so uniformly traded, no pooling of funds for
a common purpose is alleged." Id. at 278.
99. Id. at 276-77. The Milnarik court did not comment on the fact that a group of
investors did exist in the form of family members.
100. 561 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1977).
101. Id. at 100.
102. Id. at 98. Pursuant to this agreement, Hirk placed $10,000 in the account and executed
a power of attorney appointing Agri-Research as his agent. Hirk alleged that the discretionary
trading account agreement was an investment contract. Id.
103. Id. at 101.
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viewed in terms of the substance and economic realities underlying
the transaction.c1 4 Despite these broad principles, the court interpreted
the Howey test as requiring a sharing of profits or pooling of funds
by multiple investors. 05 In justification of this position, the court
emphasized that Congress did not intend to include every conceivable
transaction into the statutory definition of a security. °6 The court,
07
however, failed to provide authority for this limitation.
In contrast to these two cases, the same court in Stenger v. R.H.
Love Galleries, Inc.,"'1 analyzed the common enterprise element of
the Howey test by using both the strict vertical and the horizontal
commonality tests.9 In Stenger, twelve paintings were purchased
from Love Galleries for $1.5 million. 1' 0 By the terms of the sales
agreement, either Stenger or Love Galleries could resell the paintings."' Since a pooling of funds or a sharing of profits by multiple
investors was lacking, the court found that the transaction did not
12
meet the horizontal commonality test.
The court also applied the strict vertical commonality test."' According to the court, strict vertical commonality requires the successes
and losses of the parties to be interrelated. 14 In this case, the parties
had different financial interests in selling the art collection. 5 Stenger
was free to sell the paintings and experience a personal gain or loss." 6
Love Galleries could also sell the paintings and collect the commission
irrespective of whether Stenger benefitted from the sale." 7 Because
Stenger and Love Galleries did not share the same financial risk, the
court did not find the requisite vertical commonality."' The court,

104. Id. at 99-100 (referring to Milnarik court construction of term "security").
105. Id. at 101 (stating the Milnarikdecision was based on the correct underlying assumption
that a sharing of profits or pooling of funds was required by Howey).
106. Id. at 102. See also Note, The Sale of Business Doctrine: A Decade After Forman,
49 BROOKLYx L. Rv. 1325, 1326 (1983) (noting Congress never intended the Acts to encompass
all instruments that might be subjected to fraud).
107. Hirk, 561 F.2d at 101.
108. 741 F.2d 144 (7th Cir. 1984).
109. Id. at 146-47.

110. Id. at 145.
111.
by not
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
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Id. at 145-46. The investor sued Love Galleries for violating federal securities laws
registering the alleged investment contract as a security. Id. at 145.46.
Id. at 147.
Id.
Id. at 146-47.
Id.
Id. at 147.
Id.
Id.
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however, did not discuss the reasons for considering both approaches
to commonality." 9
B.

Vertical Commonality: Broad Interpretation

In determining the existence of a common enterprise, several courts
have broadly applied the vertical commonality approach. 20 These
2
courts have focused on the role of the promoter in the transaction.1 '

The requisite commonality exists if the success or failure of the
investment is dependent upon the expertise of the promoter.'2 This

view does not consider the economic relationship between the promoter and the investor or between investors.'2 Instead, the focus is

on the skill, judgment and knowledge of the promoter regarding the
investment and how these factors influence the decisions made by
24

the investor.
The leading case illustrating the broad vertical commonality approach is Securities & Exchange Commission v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc. 2 In Koscot, each investor paid a sum of money to become
a representative for Koscot in the sale of cosmetics. 26 Each investor
could earn substantial sums of money by convincing other persons
to become associated with Koscot.' 27 The new participants were paid
a sum of money for the right to participate in the Koscot endeavor,
and the original investor who attracted the new participant received
a commission. 2 Each investor was required to follow the Koscot
method. 29 This entailed significant efforts by the Koscot members

119.

Id.

120. E.g., S.E.C. v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 478-79 (5th Cir. 1974);
S.E.C. v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 522-23 (5th Cir. 1974) (broad
application of vertical commonality).
121. Continental,497 F.2d at 522. "[The critical factor is not the similitude or coincidence
of investor input, but rather the uniformity of impact of the promoter's efforts." Id. (quoting
Koscot, 497 F.2d at 478).
122. Id. The critical inquiry is confined to whether the success or failure of the investments
are essentially dependent upon promoter expertise. Id.
123. Id. But see Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274, 277 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972); Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d
216, 224-25 (6th Cir. 1980) (the focus of fulfilling the common enterprise element is on the
relationship between investors as exemplified by the pooling of funds or pro rata distribution
of profits).
124. Continental, 497 F.2d at 522.
125. 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974).
126. Id. at 475-76.
127. Id.
128. Id. (Koscot endeavor was a pyramid scheme).
129. Id. at 476.
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to create illusions of wealth to entice new participants to sign a
membership contract. 13 0
Applying Howey, the Koscot court found a common enterprise
between the original investor and the Koscot organization.' A broad
interpretation of vertical commonality required the court to focus on
the expertise of the promoter. 3 2 The requisite commonality was found
because the investors' successes and losses were directly dependent
on the effectiveness of the Koscot meetings.' The illusions of wealth
and high-pressure sales techniques of the Koscot meetings resulted in
more membership contracts. 3 4 The investors' profits were directly
tied to the commissions from membership contracts.' The decision
in Koscot was followed two days later by the Securities & Exchange
Commission v. Continental Commodities Corp.'36 Applying the Howey
test, the court held that the sale of discretionary commodity trading
accounts constituted an investment contract. 37 In Continental Commodities, the fact that the investor relied on the expertise of the
broker for the success of the investment established the requisite
commonality. 3 8 The Continental Commodities court expanded the
broad view of commonality to include a broker-customer relationship. 139 Since the customer relied on the investment counseling provided by the broker, the common enterprise element of the Howey
test was satisfied." 40
Both the Koscot and Continental decisions rejected a rigid application of the Howey test.' 4 1 According to the Court of Appeals for

130. Id.
131. Id. at 478-86. The court interpreted the "solely from efforts of others" requirement
of the Howey test as including schemes where the investors participate in the venture to a
minimal degree. Id. at 481.
132. Id. at 478.
133. Id. at 479. The court specifically rejected the horizontal approach which requires

pooling of funds by multiple investors such that the returns of one investor are dependent on
all the other instruments. Id.

134.

Id. at 484-85.

135. Id. at 485.
136. 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974).
137. Id. at 521-22.
138. Id. at 522.
139. Id. at 522-23. A broker-customer relationship is an agent-principal relationship. Id.
See also BLACK's LAW DicIoNARY 57-58 (5th ed. 1979) (agency is a relationship in which one
person acts for or represents another by latter's authority, either in relationship of principal
and agent, or master and servant).
140. Continental, 497 F.2d at 522-23. The court stated that the actual productive effect of

the counseling was not important but rather that the potential for success was contingent on
the counseling. Id.
141. See id. at 521; S.E.C. v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 478-79 (5th Cir.

1974).
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the Fifth Circuit, the Howey test is a resilient standard that should

be capable of reaching any scheme that falls within the ordinary
concept of a security.142 Thus, the emphasis on the promoter's

expertise accords with the flexible standard described in Howey
and
143
statutes.
security
the
underlying
purposes
remedial
broad
the
C.

Vertical Commonality: Strict Interpretation
In contrast to the broad interpretation, the strict interpretation of
vertical commonality requires that the economic successes or losses
of the investor and promoter be mutually dependent. 144 Thus, the
strict approach requires that the financial successes of an investor

145
directly rise or fall with that of the promoter, and vice versa.

Unlike the broad approach, the strict view requires a sharing of the

financial risk of the venture. 46 Brodt v. Bache & Co. 47 exemplifies
the application of the strict approach to vertical commonality.
In Brodt, the investor opened a discretionary commodities trading
account after being solicited to do so by Bache & Co., a national
brokerage firm. 48 The court in Brodt defined a common enterprise
as a venture in which the profits of the investor and the broker are
interwoven and mutually dependent.

49

The court did not look at the

nature of the promoter's expertise in determining whether the necessary commonality was present.

50

Moreover, the court did not

require that the investor pool interests or share profits with other
investors.15 ' Rather, the court focused solely on the nature of the
142. Continental, 497 F.2d at 521-22.
143. S.E.C. v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 480 (5th Cir. 1974).
144. Mordaunt v. Incomco, 686 F.2d 815, 817 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1115
(1985). An agent-principal relationship would not qualify as a security using the strict approach
because the economic fates of the promoter and investor are independent. The promoter will
earn the usual commission despite the profits or losses of the investor. Id. Even if the promoter
is paid on a commission based on a percentage of the profits made by the investor, this does
not qualify as an investment contract under the strict approach. See Meyer v. Thomas &
McKinnon Auchincloss Kohlmeyer, Inc., 686 F.2d 818, 819 (9th Cir. 1982) (investment contract
not found where promoter received percentage of assets because investor could withdraw funds.
from the account and promoter would not have shared profits), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1023
(1983).
145. See Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459, 461 (9th Cir. 1978); Mordaunt, 686 F.2d
at 817. See also S.E.C. v. Goldfield Deep Mines Co., 758 F.2d 459, 463 (9th Cir. 1985)
(requires a "direct correlation" between an investor and a promoter).
146. See Brodt, 595 F.2d at 461.
147. 595 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1978).
148. Id. at 459-60 (the investor authorized the representative at Bache & Co. to withdraw
funds to finance commodity transactions at the broker's discretion).
149. Id. at 460 (reaffirming previous definition of common enterprise).
150. Id. at 461 (rejecting the expansive view of vertical commonality).
151. Id. at 460-61 (expressly rejecting horizontal commonality).
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investor-promoter relationship. 5 2 Since the broker had no stake in

the investment, the court did not find the requisite commonality.

53

D. Contrasting the Three Commonality Theories
The horizontal test restricts commonality to transactions that have
more than one investor. 5 4 Regardless of the nature of the fraud
perpetrated by a provider, the common enterprise element will not
be satisfied unless more than one investor participates in a single
investment enterprise.155 Further, the courts applying this approach
require that the participation by multiple investors be evidenced by
a sharing of profits or pooling of capital. 56 To justify this position,
multiple
courts have relied on the fact that the Howey case involved
5 7
investors participating in a single investment enterprise.
In developing the standard for determining whether a transaction
is an investment contract, however, the Howey court emphasized the
dynamic and flexible nature of the test." 8 The Howey court argued
that by defining security to include an investment contract, Congress
intended to protect the public from all deceptive schemes. 59 Therefore, to fulfill the broad remedial purposes underlying the federal
securities laws, and to be consistent with the underlying rationale of
Howey, the common enterprise element should not be limited strictly
to the facts of the Howey case.
Because of the rigid nature of the horizontal test, other courts
have applied vertical commonality to the common enterprise element
of the Howey test. 6° Using the broad approach, the requisite commonality can be found if one investor relies on the skill, knowledge,

152.

Id. at 461.

153. Id. The requisite commonality was lacking because the success or failure of the
brokerage firm did not correlate with the success or failure of the investor. Since the
commissions received by the brokerage firm were not dependent on the individual success of
the investors' account and vice versa, the court did not find the requisite commonality. Id.
154.

E.g., Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96, 100-01 (7th Cir. 1977).

155. See id.
156.

See id. at 101 (interpreting Howey as requiring pooling of funds). See also Milnarik

v. M.S. Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274, 278 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972).
157.

See, e.g., Hirk, 561 F.2d at 101. See also S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293,

294-98 (1946). This interpretation, however, deserves a closer analysis. The facts of Howey
indicate that the payments by individual investors were for the purchase or servicing of
individual tracts. The profits were based on an estimate of the yield of each individual tract

and was not a pro rata distribution. Id. at 295-96.
158. Howey, 328 U.S. at 299.
159. Id.

160. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 1974).
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and judgment of the promoter.' 6 ' The need for multiple investors is

eliminated. 62 The broad view of vertical commonality is the only
approach that has found a common enterprise in a broker-customer

relationship. 6

Although a broker is technically the agent of the

customer, the courts have found commonality by focusing on the

broker's expertise. 64
Broad vertical commonality would be lacking, however, when the
investor has knowledge about a transaction and therefore is not
dependent on the expertise of the promoter. 6 5 For example, an expert
in the field of gold mining who invests money into a gold mining

scheme would be automatically excluded from the scope of the
Securities Acts merely because the investor would not be entirely
dependent upon the knowledge and judgment of the promoter. This

exclusion contravenes the broad remedial purposes'6 behind the
Securities Acts and does not comport with the flexible standard set

forth in Howey.' 67 The Securities Acts were designed to protect all
members of the public from fraudulent schemes devised by promoters
regardless of the expertise of the investor.1 6 Knowledge and expertise

in an area do not necessarily make an investor less vulnerable to
fraud. The broad approach, therefore, unduly restricts the application
of the Howey test.
Finally, some courts have restricted the application of the Howey

test through the strict vertical view of commonality. 69 The strict view
requires the investor and promoter to be involved in a common

161. E.g., S.E.C. v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 522 (5th Cir. 1974).
162. Id.
163. Id. See also Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216,
222-23 (6th Cir. 1980). Horizontal commonality does not exist unless there also exists some
relationship that ties the fortunes of each investor to the success of the overall venture. Id.
164. Continental, 497 F.2d 522.
165. See id.
166. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967). The Court emphasized that a
broad and expansive scope of the statutory definition of a security was necessary to carry out
the remedial statutory purposes of the securities laws. See also Landreth Timber Co. v.
Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 687-88 (1985) (citing the Howey case as describing the definition of
a security as broad so as to ensure full and fair disclosure with respect to a wide range of
instruments). "[T]he reach of the Act does not stop at the obvious and commonplace." Id.
(quoting S.E.C. v. C.M. Joiner, 320 U.S. 344 (1943)).
167. S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey, Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946). See S.E.C. v. Koscot
Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 481 (5th Cir. 1974). "Moreover, a significant number of
federal courts invoking the Howey test, have either given it a broader more salutary application
or endorsed such an application in principle." Id.
168. See S.E.C. v. Glenn W. Turner, Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 481 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 821 (1973). "The Acts were designed to protect the American public from speculative or
fraudulent schemes of promoters." Id. (citing S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933)).
169. See Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459, 461 (9th Cir. 1978).
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venture without mandating that other investors also be involved in
the venture. 170 Instead of focusing on the promoter's influence over
the investment decision, 171 the strict approach requires the investor
and the promoter to share in the risks of the scheme.'72 In addition,
of
the strict vertical approach rejects the necessity of a pooling
7
investments or investor renumeration on a pro rata basis. 1
Technically, the horizontal approach is very similar to the strict
vertical approach because the promoter and investor in strict vertical
commonality must pool funds or share profits. 74 The horizontal
approach, however, requires a promoter and at least two investors. 75
Furthermore, the horizontal commonality test does not require that
the promoter share in the financial risk of the endeavor. 76 Vertical
commonality would not be found under the strict approach in any
scheme in which the promoter did not participate in the risks of the
venture. 77 The protections provided by the Securities Acts should
encompass fraudulent schemes devised by promoters regardless of
whether the promoter shares the risks of the venture. 7 As a result,
the horizontal approach does not provide the intended broad scope
of protection underlying the security statutes.
The court in Howey emphasized the need for a flexible application
of the test to address the broad remedial purposes underlying the
securities statutes. 179 Each approach for determining commonality
frustrates these purposes by unduly restricting the reach of the Howey
test. A better approach to the commonality element would be to
broaden its definition.
PROPOSAL

The determination of whether a transaction has the requisite commonality required by the Howey test must comport with the intent
of Congress. In addition, the approach must be consistent with the
guidance provided by the United States Supreme Court in the Howey
case. The only way to satisfy both of these criteria is to consider all

170.

Id.

171. See S.E.C. v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 475 (5th Cir. 1974).
172. Brodt, 595 F.2d at 461.
173. Id. at 460-61.

174.

See id.

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

See Koscot, 497 F.2d at 479.
Id.
See S.E.C. v. Goldfield Deep Mines Co., 758 F.2d 459, 463 (9th Cir. 1985).
See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey, Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946).
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three of the commonality tests in determining whether the common
enterprise element of the Howey test has been satisfied. A judge 8 °
should consider whether the underlying scheme involves horizontal,
strict vertical, or broad vertical commonality. If any one of the
commonality approaches is satisfied, then a common enterprise exists.
Thus, a judge will not be limited to viewing just the relationship
between the investors,'"' but will be required to examine the rela8 2 as well as the
tionship between the investor and the promoter,1
8
impact of the promoter's expertise on the transaction. 1
Although this flexible approach will result in more transactions
qualifying as investment contracts, the scope of the Howey test will
not be unlimited. The judge still determines whether the other elements of the Howey test have been satisfied. 8 4 Thus, a transaction
having the requisite commonality while not satisfying the other
elements of the Howey test will not be considered an investment
contract.
The advantages of this analysis in determining whether the commonality element of the Howey test has been satisfied are twofold.
First, by considering all of the commonality tests, more transactions
would qualify as investment contracts. Thus, courts would effectuate
the legislative objective of providing a broad scope of protection to
the public. 85 In addition, application of a broader, more flexible
approach would effectuate the intent of the United States Supreme

180. United States v. Carman, 577 F.2d 556, 562 (9th Cir. 1978) (although characterization
of a transaction raises questions of law and fact, the ultimate issue of whether or not a
particular set of facts is an investment contract is a question of law).
181. E.g., Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274, 278 (7th Cir.) (horizontal
commonality), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972).
182. E.g., Mordaunt v. Incomco, 686 F.2d 815, 817 (9th Cir. 1982) (strict vertical commonality), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1115 (1985).
183. E.g., S.E.C. v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 522 (5th Cir. 1974)
(broad vertical commonality).
184. S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946).
185. See id. (quoting H.R. RaP. No. 85, 73d Cong., Ist Sess., 11 (1933)). Congressional
purpose in enacting the legislation was to protect investors by "compelling full and fair
disclosure relative to the issuance of the many types of instruments that in our commercial
world fall within the ordinary concept of a security." Id. See generally J. SEUGmAN, supra
note 27, at 38 (quoting 2 TBE PUBLiC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLMN D. RoOSEVELT
213-14 (1938)).
The new law [referring to the Securities Act of 1933] will also safeguard against the
abuses of high-pressure salesmenship in security flotations. It will require full
disclosure of all the private interests on the part of those who seek to sell securities
to the public. The Act is thus intended to correct some of the evils which have been
so glaringly revealed in the private exploitation of the public's money.

Id.
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Court that the term investment contract should embrace newly created
18 6
deceptive schemes.
Second, requiring the judge to consider all the commonality approaches would produce more consistent results in the application of
the Howey test. The courts that use horizontal commonality require
the pooling of funds by investors at the cost of excluding transactions
with vertical commonality and vice versa. If all the courts were to
apply each of the approaches, the results would be consistent in
determining whether an instrument has the characteristics of an
investment contract.
CONCLUSION

The legislative intent in enacting the securities provisions was to
regulate the securities industry to protect the public from fraudulent
and deceptive practices. The definition of security includes investment
contract. Although courts agree on the use of the Howey test in
determining whether a transaction is an investment contract, confusion exists as to the common enterprise element of the Howey test.
The courts have developed various solutions to the problem. Neither
the horizontal test nor the broad or strict tests of vertical- commonality, however, comports with the legislative intent and the remedial
purposes of the Securities Acts. Only by applying each of the
commonality tests to a transaction can these goals be achieved. If
any one of the tests are satisfied, then the common enterprise element
has been satisfied. This approach will result in more transactions
qualifying as an investment contract within the definition of a security. Thus, the broad remedial purposes underlying the federal
securities laws and the flexible standard admonished by the United
States Supreme Court in Howey will be achieved.
Susan G. Flanagan

186. S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey, Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946). See also S.E.C. v. Koscot
Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 483-84 (5th Cir. 1974) ("adoption of a resilient standard
which will allow for a practical and dynamic scrutiny of investment schemes").
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